Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences by Laurie Simon Bagwell & John B. Shoven
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences





Chapter Title: Share Repurchases and Acquisitions: An Analysis of Which Firms Participate
Chapter Author: Laurie Simon Bagwell, John B. Shoven
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2057
Chapter pages in book: (p. 191 - 220)A
7 ShareRepurchases and
Acquisitions: An Analysis of
Which Firms Participate
Laurie Simon Bagwell and John B. Shoven
7.1Introduction
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that dividends are the primary
means of transferring cash from the firm to its shareholders, nondivi-
dend cash payments surpassed dividends in the two most recent years
for which data are available, 1984 and 1985 (Shoven 1986). This de-
velopment challenges the "trapped-equity" cost of capital models' which
equate the cost of retained earnings to the after-tax yield
of the alternative considered, namely, dividends. If dividends are the
only alternative to retaining earnings, the high taxation of dividends
lowers the shadow cost of retained earnings and hence lowers the cost
of capital. On the other hand, if cash can be and is paid out in non-
dividend form, with lower taxes, the economics profession needs to
change the way it computes the cost of equity capital.
In this paper we review the theoretical rationale for nondividend
cash payments. These payments can take the form of either share
repurchase programs or cash mergers. The primary new material of
this paper is an econometric investigation into what types of firms
engage in these two forms of share acquisition programs: repurchasing
own shares or acquiring the shares of other firms. We examine whether
the same characteristics of the firm determine both mergers (or ac-
quisitions) and share repurchases. Because these activities are so much
more prominent now, than in the past, we also examine whether the
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type of firm involved in these activities has changed since a decade Table
ago.
Initial
7.2Alternative Hypotheses about Nondividend Cash Payments Profit
Theliterature has spawned numerous hypotheses about why firms
Value
makenondividend cash payments. We discuss several in turn.
7.2.1Taxation and the Preference for Share Repurchases
Cash
Inthe absence of informational asymmetries between stockholders by
andmanagement, and in the absence of taxes and transactions costs, Value
dividendsand repurchasing shares are equivalent. Whether it disburses aft
agiven amount of cash in one form or the other, the firm's total value Num
will be the same. It will have the same debt-equity ratio, the same Prke
ownership claims, the same real assets, the same opportunities, and Taxe
thereforethe same value. In other words, it is possible to produce Accr
exactlythe same consequences by either distributional form. After a
share repurchase, each shareholder can sell sufficient shares to match
the cash flow he would have received from a dividend. After a dividend of th
payment, the shareholder can use the dividend proceeds to buy addi-
tional shares in the company and therefore reproduce the percentage
interest he would have had if he had declined to sell in a share repur- per
chase program. of t,
Taxes cause a major break in this equivalence, to the disadvantage dlvii
of dividends and, therefore, to the relative advantage of share repur- 9.Oc
chase for taxable households or individuals.2 It is still true, however, by
that the total equity value of the firm should be the same after the seth
payment of an equivalent amount of cash in either dividend or share $10
repurchase form. This equivalence rests on the idea that the firm has N
the same assets, capital structure, and future opportunities in either
case. If the cash is paid out as a dividend, it is fully taxable. But if it gain
is paid out as a repurchase, the payment results in a capital gain to the
shareholders of the amount of the purchase.3 Most of this capital gain, avei
however, is accrued and not realized. on
To fully understand the share repurchase strategy, consider the sim- T
pie example outlined in table A hypothetical company is originally low
financed by the issue of 100 shares at $10 each. The company uses the stat
$1,000 proceeds to purchase productive capital, and after a year it has be i
realized a $100 profit. The competitive market value of the firm is now shai
$1,100 ($11 per share), as the company now consists of a fully restored
$1,000 machine and $100 cash. rese
Consider two strategies of returning the $100 earnings to the share- ers
holders. If the money is paid out as a dividend (strategy A), the personal
tax bill will be $28 if the marginal tax rate of the equity holders is 28 the193 Share Repurchases and Acquisitions
cade Table7.1 An Example of a Dividend Payment and a Share Repurchase for a
Hypothetical Firm
Initial financing 100 shares at $10/share $1,000
Profit 100 shares at $ I/share $100
Value at end of year100 shares at $11/share $1,100
irms
StrategyA Strategy B
$1 dividend payment/shareRepurchase $100 worth of shares
Cash received $100 $100
ders byshareholders
ostS, Value of firm $1,000 $1,000
rses aftertransaction
alue Numberof shares 100 90.91
ame Priceper share $10 $11
and Taxesowed" $28 $2.55
juce Accruedcapital gain5 $0.00 $90.91
era "Assumesa personal tax rate of 28 percent.
atch hAccruedcapital gains will generate a future tax obligation if realized. A recent estimate
[end of the effective tax rate on accrued capital gains is about 5 percent.
ddi-
tage
pur- percent. The net-of-tax receipts from the dividend are $72. The value
of the company would return to $1,000, or $10 per share, after the
tage dividend payment. On the other hand, if the firm uses its $100 to buy
pur- 9.09 of its shares at a price of $11 (strategy B), the total realized gain
ver, bythose who sell theirshares to the firm is $9.09, assuming that the
the sellersare among those who originallyfinanced the firm at a price of
hare $10 per share. The tax on that $9.09 would be $2.55.
has Note that the company's shares will remain at $1 Iafter the repur-
ther chase and therefore each of the remaining 90.91 shares has an accrued
if it gain of one dollar. These accrued gains will generate some taxes for
n to the government, although the present value of the taxes depends on
am, average holding periods, as well as any escape from capital gains taxes
on assetsthatpassthroughestates.
sim- This example demonstrates that share repurchases result in much
ally lower personal taxes than do dividends, under the taxation assumptions
the stated here. Even so, this case may exaggerate what would actually
has be paid in a share repurchase. In the real world, investors buy their
shares at different times and at different prices, and those most likely
red to tender their shares back to the company will be those with the lowest
reservation price on holding the shares.5 These will include sharehold-
are- ers who have actually lost money on their investments. The government
)nal may therefore receive no immediate revenue from those who receive
S 28 the corporate cash. The example also illustrates that the advantage of194Laurie Simon BagweJl and John B. Shoven 195
share repurchase over dividends exists even when realized capital gains tions
are taxed at the same rate as dividends (as is the case both in the of del
example and under the new tax law). highet
The tax advantage of share repurchase relative to dividends may be
apowerful explanation of why share repurchases have become more An
prevalent. But because the explanation hinges on the fact that capital be
gains are taxed on a realization basis and escape taxation when passed in pul
through estates (rather than depending on characteristics of the firm), certat
it is not an argument that can be readily addressed with cross-sectional Neve
econometrics. Nonetheless, it does suggest that dividend yield on the facinl
common stock and, perhaps, increases in the dividend rate may be lever
predictors of participation in share repurchase activities. The tax ad- firm (
vantage implies that share repurchase may be a substitute means of of soi
transmitting cash to shareholders, and thus firms with high dividend a hig
yields or which have increased dividends may be less likely to repur- This
chase shares. value
7.2.2Repurchaseas a Transitional Mechanism for Adjusting the autoi
Debt-Equity Ratio at le
In the absence of transactions costs and taxes at both the personal and
and corporate level, and with fully informed investors, shareholders the
will be indifferent about the price offered in a share repurchase plan. Both
In a fundamental way they are buying the shares from themselves, and chas
so their indifference comes from their being both the buyer and the ing
seller. The heterogeneity of shareholders, however, creates a potential the
transfer between those who sell and those who do not. This possibility mar
is diminished if all shareholders have an equal right to participate, and T;
if shares are offered on a pro rata basis in the event the offer is over- pric
subscribed (as is required by Securities and Exchange Commission rule mor
13e-4). less
With no taxes, as Modigliani and Miller (1958) demonstrated, the byt
value of the firm is also invariant to its financial structure. But in the The
presence of both personal and corporate taxes, there appears to be a enc
substantial tax advantage of debt, because interest is tax deductible con
from the corporation income tax, whereas dividends and other equity the
earnings are not. Miller (1977) argued, however, that although the ag- plic
gregate amount of debt in the economy is determinate, the capital 0
structure for any individual firm is irrelevant, since the return on debt tior
and equity incorporate taxes (the weak form of the Modigliani-Miller the
theorem). This proposition received empirical support from Trzcinka tha
(1982). In contrast, Ross (1985), allowing for uncertainty, showed how to 1
firms may have an interior optimal debt-equity ratio. The standard
model of a firm's optimal debt-equity ratio involves first order condi- infi
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gains tions trading off the tax advantages of debt against the agency costs
n the of debt, as well as the inflexibility of debt in times of crisis. That is,
higher debt ratios increase the likelihood of incurring the real costs
ay be associated with bankruptcy.
more An adequate model of optimal debt-equity ratios would, of necessity,
apital be very complex and would depend on variables that are unobservable
•issed in publicly available information about the firm, variables such as Un-
firm), certainty and restrictions on the creation of state-contingent claims.
-ional Nevertheless, it is possible to predict some changes in the environment
n the facing the firm that might cause its managers to want to adjust its
y be leverage ratio. For instance, a change in the underlying riskiness of the
x ad- firm (perhaps arising from the maturing of a market or the resolution
ns of of some technological uncertainties) may allow the firm to operate with
dend a higher leverage ratio and enjoy more of the tax advantages of debt.
This change in risk, or many other factors, may cause higher equity
values. When stock market valuations increase dramatically (as they
certainly have in the past four years), the leverage ratios of firms are
e automatically lowered. In many cases it will be optimal for the firm to
at least partially offset this change in financial ratios by issuing debt
onal and absorbing equity. When the tax rate applicable to bonds decreases,
Iders the optimal aggregate debt level increases, even in a Miller analysis.
plan. Both dividends and share repurchases absorb equity. But share repur-
and chases may be a better mechanism for the transitional purpose of chang-
the ing the debt-equity ratio than an increased dividend (as suggested by
ntial the work of Feldstein and Green 1983) because of the penalty that the
market imposes on firms that later cut their dividend.
and Taxes and transactions costs alter investors' neutrality regarding the
ver- price offered in share repurchase programs. Higher prices mean that
rule more of the cash paid out will be taxed as a realized capital gain and
less as a return of capital. This effect is probably outweighed, however,
the by the leverage adjustment effect of higher equity pricesjust mentioned.
the The underlying theory suggests, therefore, that higher share prices will
be a encourage share repurchases, rather than discourage them as is the
tible common wisdom. As well, there will be an economywide increase in
uity the debt to equity expected given a decline in the taxation levels ap-
ag- plicable to bonds.
utal One problem with this explanation of share repurchase as a transi-
lebt tional instrument in adjusting debt-equity ratios is that it depends on
iller the difference between actual leverage and optimal leverage, a variable
nka that can be neither observed nor predicted. In the empirical analysis
low to follow, we include the actual debt-equity ratio as an explanatory
ard variable. The theory does not, however, predict even the sign of its
influence on share acquisition activities.196Laurie Simon Bagwell and John B. Shoven 197
7.2.3Repurchase as an Anti-Takeover Strategy likely
Another reason firms may buy back their own shares instead of measi
paying dividends is to fend off a takeover attempt (Bagwell 1986). In ook
paying dividends, a company gives cash to all shareholders in propor-
e
tion to their shareholdings. However, if the cash is used to make a
share repurchase tender offer, only those who tender their shares (or cas
a pro rataproportion of those tendered) will receive cash from the
firm. Due to heterogeneous inframargina! rents to holding across share- ic l(
holders, there exists an upward sloping supply curve representing the prete
prices at which shareholders are willing to sell. The cash dividend does
not change the distribution of reservation values, whereas the share
repurchase buys out those with the lowest reservation prices, leaving
behind those who would sell only when offered a premium above the
g
h tender offer price. Moreover, the position of the supply curve endo-
genizes the distributional choice and its effect on the possibility of
takeover. As is shown in Bagwell (1986), the cost to the bidding firm
7 2 5
ofacquiring control of the target will be larger if the target distributes
a fixed amount of cash through share repurchase than if it does so
through a cash dividend. This explanation is consistent with the recent In
spate of repurchases motivated solely as takeover deterrence. We there-
fore would predict an increase in restructurings, especially repur- back
chases, in response to the threat of takeover, firm
acqt
7.2.4Free Cash Flow and the Preference for Share Repurchases of ti
Jensen (1986) has analyzed the principal-agent problem that exists hold
when an organization generates a substantial free cash flow. Managers havi
have an incentive to increase the resources under their control, and casi
need to be motivated not to grow beyond wealth maximization. Given the
this incentive, managers with substantial free cash flow may choose A
repurchase or dividends instead of investments. This choice gives them shai
control over future cash flow that would be lost if the resources were acti
invested. valu
Issuing debt to buy back stock creates an incentive for managers to real
overcome their inefficiencies. The fixed payment pattern of the debt diss
allows them to commit to transferring resources to their financial claim- equ
ants. Jensen focused on the example of the oil industry in the late acti
l970s: a case of simultaneous free cash flow and necessary industry deb
shrinkage. He documented that oil firms were purchasing other corn-
panies, as well as restructuring themselves, consistent with the agency don
costs of free cash flow. The theory suggests a positive effect of cash cha
flow on the probability of repurchase and acquisition. 1
The free cash flow hypothesis also implies that firms with low levels sets
of investment, or poor internal investment opportunities, are more the197 Share Repurchases and Acquisitions
likelyto engage in share repurchases. A potentially useful but imperfect
df measure of internal investment opportunities is the ratio of price to
ea book value. This ratio approximates Tobin's q in our attempt to capture
86).
- the q theory of investment first developed in Tobin (1969).
ropor An expectation of future cash flow is theorized to be signaled through
iake cash disbursed to shareholders in a tender office. Vermaelen (1981)
es found the per share earnings of tendering firms were above the pre-
m t
- dictions of a preannouncement time-series model, a finding he inter-
5 are preted as evidence that the tender offer serves as an announcement of ngt: favorable earnings prospects. Dann (1981) concluded as well that the
h
information signaled by repurchase may be improvements in cash flows.
S are Ofer and Thakor (1986) differentiated the repurchase signal from the
aving signal implied by dividend payments. This hypothesis of a signaling of
d - cash flow reconfirms the free cash flow expectation of a repurchase
of motivated by high cash flow.
firm
I. 7.2.5The Equivalence of Share Repurchases and Mergers
uU and Acquisitions
so
In the absence of informational problems, taxes, and transactions
here- costs, buying shares in another company is nearly equivalent to buying
back one's own. Rather than returning cash to the shareholders, the
firm instead buys a financial investment. If the market value of the
acquired asset is equal to what the firm pays forthen in the absence
S of transactions costs the acquisition is as good as cash to the stock-
xists holders of the acquiring firm. If there are transactions costs, they would
gers have to be taken into account since some investors might now prefer
and cash, and some investors may want to rebalance their portfolio after
iven the acquisition.
'ose Although it is certainly true that if we relax the above assumptions
hem share repurchases and acquisitions may serve different purposes, both
actions convey similar tax advantages over dividends by transfering
value to shareholders in a manner that results in capital gains (both
s to realized and accrued) rather than ordinary income. The actions are
ebt dissimilar, however, in that a merger or acquisition does not absorb
im- equity, whereas a repurchase does not a priori increase debt. The two
late activities, therefore, are not perfect substitutes in attaining optimal
try debt-equity ratios. This implies that previous appreciation in the firm's
stock price may positively predict acquisitions (if the acquisition is
done to increase leverage) and similarly may encourage share repur-
ash chases (if done to absorb equity).
The equivalence of the two share acquisition policies requires strong
els sets of assumptions. It is an interesting empirical issue, however. In
)re the analysis below we separate the regressions for the two phenomena,198Laurie Simon BagwellandJohn B Shoven
unwilling to accept ex ante the hypothesis that the two are perfect such
substitutes. We desire to investigate whether the hypothesis appears
credible. obse
the 7.2.6Clientele and Management Effects
nati
For many economists, the payment of dividends, appearing to be tax choi
disadvantaged, remains a puzzle despite the multitude of theories of- trib
fered to explain them.7 Share acquisition seems to offer too great a tax the
saving not to be preferred to dividends. But the tax argument is true
only for some classes of investors. Nontaxable institutions are indif- asy
• ferent to tax-based arguments, and they are very large market partic- cha
ipants. With transactions costs, it can be argued that such organizations
as pension funds and private university endowments might find dlvi- 7.3.
• dends the preferred form of return. T
The implication of this argument is that firms may specialize to a md
clientele. Those firms that pay returns as dividends may be held dis- file
proportionately by tax-exempt organizations, whereas those that retain spe
earnings, repurchase shares, or engage in mergers may be predomi- be
nantly held by taxable owners. Although the necessary taxation infor-
mation to assess this is not included in our data source, we do know pui
a firm's previous participation history. If the clientele theory is valid, elii
certain firms can be expected to have a propensity to perform these oni
activities year after year.
There are other poorly understood aspects of corporate accounting
and financial behavior. One is the choice of inventory accounting tech- bu
niques, particularly in times of inflation. Firms can choose between
first in, first out (FIFO) and last in, first out (LIFO) methods. With la
inflation FIFO generally leads to larger reported and taxable profits ce
than LIFO. FIFO seems to be a nonoptimizing choice, as if investors te
cannot "see through" the accounts to ascertain real earnings. We can th
examine whether some managements are more likely to take advantage
of tax-saving opportunities, if they exist, by seeing whether the firms
that use the tax-efficient LIFO policy are those that also use nondi- vi
vidend means of transferring value to their shareholders. fo
ci
7.3Measurement Model and the Specific Hypotheses St
We are interested in modeling the binary choice of whether to do an
action of repurchase or acquisition, to study how various explanatory w
variables affect the probability of participation in such action. Ia
This model is motivated by the definition of an unobserved random
variable, the value of the contemplated action, as a linear function of
some observed characteristics of the firm and an unknown disturbance:
•
(1) value (action) =XB +€, ii199 Share Repurchases and Acquisitions
such that the firm chooses the action if its value exceeds some critical
years constant (which can be zero). As just noted, this value is not directly
observable. Given this limitation, we employ a binary probit to analyze
the explanatory variables for the choice between the discrete alter-
natives of whether or not to undertake the action, representing the
e tax choice with a dummy variable. If the disturbance e is normally dis-
s of- tributed, the probability that the action will be undertaken is given by
a tax the cumulative normal function of XB, and a maximum likelihood es-
true timator of the coefficients B is available that yields consistent and




The data for this analysis were collected from the 1984Compustat
toa Industrial, Over the Counter (hereafter OTC), and Industrial Research
dis- files, which yielded 2,399, 853, and 1,289 original observations, re-
tam spectively. We immediately removed 29 observations from the sample
)mi- because they lacked all data and firm identification information.
ifor- Although we are interested in predicting participation in share re-
flow purchases, we want to exclude those small repurchases intended to
did, eliminate odd lot holders. We therefore classify a firm as a repurchaser
tese only if it acquires at least one-half of one percent of its outstanding
share equity value.
ting Our use of the computerized data sources gave us a large sample,
but it also limited our data selection. We would like to test the hy-
een potheses on the tax advantages of repurchase, but the data source
Vith lacked information on the distribution of basis values and on the per-
)fits centage of holders who escape taxation through death. We thus at-
tors tempted instead to calculate a marginal tax rate of the firm, although
can this too proved impossible because of missing data in our source file.
age We have posited various relationships between the leverage ratio and
rrns cash acquisition. We therefore created the variable DBEQXY, the pre-
idi- vious year's debt-equity ratio (of book values). (For example, XY =75
for the 1976 regressions, and XY =83for the 1984 regressions.) We
created DIVINC, the percentage increase in dividends, to test the sub-
stitutability of dividends and acquisitions.
We would also like to test whether repurchase is a response to the
an threat of takeover, but financial statements do not contain data on
ry whether a threat of takeover, either overt or covert, exists. For the
large sample, therefore, we sacrificed such manually gathered infor-
mation.
Of To represent the free-cash-flow and signaling-of-cash-flow hy-
potheses, we created a cash flow ratio, CASHRAT, which is operating
income before depreciation as scaled by -total assets.8 The cash flow200Laurie Simon BagweH and John B. Shoven 201
hypothesis also implies the relevance of levels of investment and the If I
potential importance of a measure of internal investment opportunity. equit
We therefore created INVRAT, a ratio of the increase in investment to actio
the value of total assets. We created PRICEBK, the ratio of the closing price
price to book value, as an indicator of internal investment opportunities. A
If firms are using acquisitions and repurchases to achieve an optimal signj
debt-equity ratio, price appreciation should encourage repurchase. We mies
therefore created PRICE, an average of the ratios of one year's to the whe
previous year's high, low, and closing stock prices. vers
The clientele hypothesis suggests repurchase is done by firms with the
low dividend yield. We include the previous year's ratio of dividends W
to share equity value, DIVRATXY, to examine this hypothesis. To test chat
the hypothesis further, we are also interested in previous participation
history. We therefore included dummy variables for the previous year's dlvi
participation in repurchase (REPXYOI) and acquisition (ACQXYOI) the
as statistics for such habit formation.9 0
The hypothesis that managers who are smart about taxes should use twe
nondividend payments is tested by the inclusion of a dummy variable of a
IVADUM, which indicates whether the firm used LIFO or not. twe
The remaining data sample of 4,512 firms was purged of missing data
relevant for respective 1976 or 1984 regressions. This resulted in cor- abh
responding samples of 2,366 and 1,820 firms. The appendix analyzes eve
the data and the resultant samples in more detail. acr
det
7.3.2Hypotheses fun
If the hypotheses of the previous sections are correct, we have cer- the
tamexpectations about the directions and significance of the coefficients.
An increase in general equity levels caused by the stock market 7 4 growth is hypothesized to encourage firms to increase their relative
leverage by absorbing equity. That absorption can be accomplished 7.4
through repurchase. In addition, the optimal economywide level of debt
can increase with a decline in the marginal tax rate applicable to bonds.
Acquisition of a firm with higher leverage can assume increased debt
in a controlled way. This may suggest a negative relationship between'
the debt-equity ratio and these actions in 1984, with insignificance in (N
1976. co
The free cash flow hypothesis implies a positive relationship between
the cash flow ratio and the probability of both repurchase and acqui- dii,
sition. That repurchase is believed to signal future cash flow may fic
strengthen the implied relationship in the repurchase probit. an
The free cash flow hypothesis also suggests that these actions are
the result of low levels of investment or poor internal investment op-
portunities. This would be consistent with negative effects of the in- ac
vestment ratio and our q approximation for both regressions. ch201Share Repurchases and Acquisitions
the If firms use acquisition and repurchase to obtain an optimal debt-
ity. equity ratio, we would expect price appreciation consistent with the
t to action, implying a positive effect on the probability of the action of
ing price.
A test of the clientele and habit formation hypotheses would predict
nal significant positive coefficients on previous-action participation dum-
We mies. One indication of relative substitutability between actions is
the whether previous repurchase is correlated with acquisition and vice
versa. The clientele effect also predicts a negative relationship between
ith the dividend ratio and repurchase.
ds We expect a negative relationship between the percentage dividend
est change and both actions if they are substitutes to dividends. We also
- expect firms with low dividend yield to repurchase as an alternative to
r's dividend payment. We therefore expect a negative relationship between
the dividend ratio and repurchase.
Our test for smart tax managers implies a positive relationship be-
se tween the use of LIFO and repurchase. Similarly, the tax advantage
of acquisitions relative to dividends implies a positive relationship be-
tween LIFO and acquisitions.
ita We are also interested in the "importance" of the explanatory van-
ables, specifically, in what magnitude they alter the probability of the
es event (the dummy variable equals 1). As well, certain relationships
across equations are suggested above. We test between regressions to
determine whether a specific action is stable over time. A finding of
functional change across periods would reject the null hypothesis that





Table 7.2 reports the results of estimating the parameters in the 1976
fl repurchase model, including the estimated intercept and coefficients,
fl (Newton-Raphson) standard errors, and the associated t-statistics. The
coefficients on the cash flow ratio and the 1975 repurchase dummy are
n positive and significant (at the .01 level). The coefficient on the 1975
dividend ratio is significant and negative (at the .025 level). The coef-
y ficient on the dividend increase is significant (at the .05 level). The q
and the investment ratio coefficients are negative and significant (at
e the .10 level).
Table 7.3 shows the results of estimating the parameters in the 1976
acquisition model. The 1975 acquisition dummy and the 1975 repur-
chase dummy are significant (at the .01 level). The price variable is
L202Laurie Simon Bagwell and John B. Shoven
Table 7.2 Probit Results for the 1976RepurchaseModel
Parameter Estimate Standard Error (-statistic
Constant —1.4944 0.1329 —11.2430
DBEQ75 —0.0208 0.0190 — l.0958
IVADUM 0.0453 0.0842 0.5384
PR/CE 0.0939 0.0779 1.2052
DIVRAT75 —2.8016 1.3843 —2.0238
DIV/NC 0.0157 0.0093 1.6805
PR/CEBK —0.1692 0.1248 —1.3555
CASHRAT 1.2997 O.411l 3.1612
INVRAT —2.1806 1.3688 —1.5931
ACQ75OI 0.0950 0.0955 0.9948
REP75OI 1.2879 0.0768 16.7790
Table 7.3 Probit Results for the 1976 Acquisition Model
Parameter Estimate Standard Error (-statistic
Constant —1.6359 0.1339 —12.2210
DBEQ75 —0.0087 0.0153 —0.5692
IVADUM —0.0427 0.0889 —0.4797
PRICE 0.1775 0.0801 2.2166
DlVRAT75 0.6850 l.2701 0.5393
DIV/NC —0.0113 0.0240 —0.4704
PRICEBK —0.3394 0.1361 —2.4941
CASHRAT 0.4775 0.4149 1.1510
!NVRAT — 1,4709 1.0590 — 1.3889
ACQ75OI 1.4180 0.0823 17.2200























significant (at the 0.25 level). The coefficient on our q approximation
is significant and negative (at the .01 level), as is the coefficient on the
investment ratio (at the.10level). 7.
1984 Probits of
Table 7.4 reports the results of estimating the parameters in the 1984
repurchase model. The cash flow ratio and the repurchase dummy are
significant (at the .01 level). Our estimate of q is significant and negative
(at the .01 level). The previous debt-equity ratio and dividend ratios
are negative and significant (at the .05 level).
Table 7.5 shows the results of estimating the parameters in the 1984
acquisition model. The 1983 acquisition dummy is significant (at the
.01 level), as are the 1983 repurchase dummy (at the .025 level) and
price (at the .05 level). Our estimate of q is significant and negative (at
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7.4.2The Importance of the Variables
We are interested in a notion, beyond significance, of the importance
of variables. Estimations of coefficients are not sufficiently informative
about the increase in the probability of an event's occunng given a
unit increase in the independent variable. Specifically, we look at how
the probability of an action changes, given a one-standard-deviation
movement in each independent variable, to normalize its impact on the
change in probability. Table 7.6 gives the mean probability derivatives
from each probit equation and the corresponding standard deviation
of each explanatory variable. We create a local approximation of the
change in the probability of the event given a one-standard-deviation
change in the explanatory variable. We look specifically at those vari-
ables found significant in the probit analysis.
Table 7.4 Probit Results for the 1984 Repurchase Model
parameter Estimate Standard Error t-statistic
Constant —0.8676 0.1166 —7.4408
DBEQ83 —0.0411 0.0188 —2.1823
IVADUM 0.0040 0.0756 0.0522
PRICE —0.0668 0.1120 —0.5965
DIVRATS3 —0.2675 0.1458 —1.8351
DIVINC 0.0258 0.0201 1.2815
PRICEBK —0.4025 0.1035 —3.888I
CASHRAT 1.2656 0.3452 3.6660
INVRAT 0.3278 0.3955 0.8288
ACQ83O! 0.0138 0.0880 0.I569
REP83O! l.21l6 0.0806 15.0410
Table 7.5 Probit Results for the 1984 Acquisition Model
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 1-statistic
Constant —1.0912 0.1073 —10.1710
DBEQ83 —0.0340 0.0180 —1.8902
IVADUM —0.0746 0.0798 —0.9348
PRICE 0.1582 0.0926 1.7094
DIVRAT83 —0.0386 0. 1656 —0.2329
DIVINC 0.0238 0.0206 1.1553
PRICEBK —0.5067 0.1328 —3.8159
CASIIRAT 0.3519 0.3260 1.0793
INVRAT 0.0216 0.4076 0.0530
ACQ83OI 1.1762 0.0828 14.2110
REP83OJ 0.1981 0.0876 2.2615
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Table 7.6 The Importance of the Explanatory Variables
StandardChange in StandardChange in
dp/dx DeviationProbability dpldx DeviationProbability
Parameter (I) (2) (1) x (2) (I) (2) (I) x (2)
1976 Repurchase Model 1976 Acquisition Model
DBEQ7S —0.00428 3.25688—.0139394—0.00163 3.25688 —.0053087
IVADUM 0.00933 0.39778 .0037112—0.00798 0.39778 —.0031742
PRICE 0.01933 0.43843 .0084748 0.03320 0.43843 .0145558
DIVRAT75—0.57718 0.03149 —.0181753 0.12811 0.03149 .0040341
DIV/NC 0.003234.05034 .0130825—0.00211 4.05034 —.0085462
PRICEBK—0.034850.41987 — .0146324—0.063470.41987—.0266491
CASHRAT 0.267750.10373 .0277737 0.08931 0.10373 .0092641
INVRAT —0.449240.06235 — .0280101—0.275090.06235 — .0171518
ACQ75OI 0.019580.33796 .0066172 0.265 19 0.33796 .0896236
REP75OI 0.26532 0.36128 .0958548 0.04679 0.36128 .0169042
1984 Repurchase Model l984 Acquisition Model
DBEQ83 —0.011503.41099 —.0392263—0.008563.41099 — .0291980
1VADUM 0.00111 0.45003 .0004995—0.018800.45003 —.0084605
PRICE —0.018690.36276 — .0067799 0.039890.36276 .0144704
DIVRAT83—0.074830.45437 — .0340005—0.009720.45437 — .0044164
DIV/NC 0.00720 1.45608 .0104837 0.00599 1.45608 .0087219
PRICEBK—0.112590.57582 —.0648315—0.127740.57582 —.0735552
CASHRAT 0.354030.17869 .0632616 0.08871 0.17869 .0158515
JNVRAT 0.091680.08341 .0076470 0.00544 0.08341 .0004537
ACQ83OI 0.003860.37984 .0014661 0.29655 0.37984 .1126415
REP83OJ 0.33893 0.38720 .1312336 0.04994 0.38720 .0193367
The dummy variable predicting habit formation most drastically af-
fects the probability of all of the outcomes. For instance, in the 1984
repurchase equation a one-standard-deviation move in the dummy vari-
able for 1983 repurchase changes the probability of repurchase by .13 1.
This is an enormous change, particularly relative to the overall sample
mean probability of a 1984 repurchase of .2632. The derivative figure
indicates that having repurchased in the previous year (the dummy
variable equals unity) versus not having done so changes the 1984
repurchase probability by .339, holding other factors constant.
Our estimate of q is also important in all equations. A one-standard-
deviation increase in the price-to-book ratio in 1984 decreases the prob-
ability of a firm's participating in repurchase by 6.5 percentage points.
This finding suggests that firms with low internal investment oppor-
tunities seek to spend their money elsewhere.
This analysis of the importance of the explanatory variables indicates
that certain factors are more important for particular actions or at






















ratio are important in both repurchase equations, consistent with the
free-cash-flow hypotheses. The debt-to-equity and dividend ratios are
ge also important in both repurchase equations. Conversely, price appre-
ciation is influential in changing the probability of acquisitions in both
— 1976and 1984. Both the price-to-book ratio and the habit variables are
consistently important, though more so in 1984.
53087 7.4.3Model Specification Predictions
11742
15558 The percentage correct of the model prediction is the sum of correctly
10341 predictedoutcomes scaled by the total number of observations. The
percentage-correct values of the 1976 repurchase, 1976 acquisition,
1984 repurchase, and 1984 acquisition models are .849, .866, .783, and
1518 .813, respectively. These findings imply that the models have predictive
6236 capability.We desire further interpretation of the predictability, how-
9042 ever,and so we explicitly compare our models to a "naive" model.
For that model we have chosen knowledge of the aggregate ratios of
— actualone dummies to nonoccurrences and then predicted accordingly.
Complete aggregate information isitself a demanding standard of
1704 comparison.
1164 Table7.7 reports matrices of the number of realizations for each
219 model of each of the 4 possible outcomes:
552
515 1.Correctly predicting an outcome occurrence (that is, Y =l/Y=I,
537 whereV is the predicted value of the dummy variable for the action,
415 aridY is the actual value).
2. Misidentifying a nonoccurrence as an action=1/V=0).The
probability of this outcome gives the size of the type-two error.
Table 7.7 Prediction Realizations





































I 198 281 479 I 224 175 399
N=1,820 N = 1,820fl
206 LaurieSimon Bagwell and John B. Shoven 207












F1fraction of ones =
total number
number of zeros
F11 = fraction of zeros =
total number
N = total number
3.Misidentifying an action as a nonoccurrence=O/Y=I).The
probability of this outcome is the size of the type-one error.
4. Correctly predicting a nonoccurrence of the event (Y =O/Y=0).
Table 7.8 calculates the realization matrix for our naive model. We
assume knowledge of the aggregate ratio of realizations, that is, we
know the total number of observations and their true division ratio
between zeros and ones. If we predict a one, we are correct by a
percentage equal to the fraction of ones. Thus, the number of real-
izations such that=1IY=Iis equal to the fraction of ones predicted
correctly times the number of ones, or F1 .F1N. We similarly cal-
culate the number of realizations in each cell of the matrix for the total
number of observations, N. We can therefore calculate the conditional
probabilities of the naive model.
The conditional probabilities of the regression models and the naive
model are given in table 7.9. Our model excels in improving the size
of type-one error, as well as in increasing the power of our predictions.
7.4.4Structural Change
Across Time
Initial observation of the results may suggest structural change across
time.'° In the repurchase model the investment ratio is significant and
negative in 1976 and insignificant and positive in 1984. Whereas the
previous year's dividend increase is significant in 1976, it lacks such
significance in 1984.
Similarly, the 1975 repurchase dummy is significant in the 1976 ac-
quisition model but not as significant in the 1984 model. The investment
ratio is significant and negative in 1976 but insignificant in 1984. Con-
versely, the previous year's debt-equity ratio is significant and negative






































babilities of theRegression Models and the
Regression Models Naive Model
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We can also expect some structural change across time given how
the relative importance of the parameters change over time. The in-
vestment ratio alters the probability of repurchase far more in 1976
than in 1984. Our approximation of q alters the probability of acquisition
far more in 1984 than 1976. In both habit formation is more important
in 1984. In addition to the possibility of changes in the probit coeffi-
cients, the increased occurrence of both repurchases and acquisitions
suggests that an intercept shift may also have occurred over time.
We test for structural change within an action across time with the
likelihood ratio test. The test is computed as LR =2(L2—L1),where
L2 is the value of the likelihood function for the maximum of the un-
constrained model, and L1 is the value with imposed constraints. This
statistic is asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared variable with
degrees of freedom equaling the difference in the number of constraints.
We are interested in testing whether the probit coefficients are con-
stant between our sample periods, allowing for the possibility of an
intercept shift. We have created two pooled samples: one for share
repurchase, and one for acquisition. Each includes a time-specific
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Table 7.10 Likelihood Ratio Tests of Structural Change across Time
Unconstrained Repurchase Constrained




2(—886.125 — 906.792 +1799.90)—(atp = .05, critical level = 18.3)
LR=13.96
Unconstrained Acquisition Constrained




2(—809.508 — 822.448 +1636.90)— (at p.05, critical level = 18.3)
LR9.89
Table 7.10 displays our results for the likelihood ratio statistic (LR)
for tests of structural change across time. In comparing the figures with
the 5 percent critical level for a chi-squared variable with ten degrees
of freedom (18.3), we find that the evidence fails to reject the null
hypothesis of no structural change in the coefficients for both repur-
chase and acquisition (as neither 13.96 nor 9.89 exceeds 18.3). None-
theless, the time-specific dummy variable is large and significant in
each pooled probit. In both cases the intercept shift indicates that these
actions become more likely for reasons not captured by our explanatory
variables. This is consistent with the previous evidence that these ac-
tivities expanded enormously between the 1970s and mid-l980s.
7.5Conclusions
The explanatory variables suggested by the hypotheses about non-
dividend cash payments collectively have substantial power in pre-
dicting participation in share repurchases and acquisitions. For instance,
relative to a naive model based on correct aggregate ratios, our probit
estimators reduce the occurrence of type-two errors (misidentifying a
nonoccurrence of the event) by roughly a factor of three.
Among the hypotheses surveyed, perhaps the free cash flow theory
is most consistent with our findings, particularly the share repurchase
ones. The cash flow variable and the price-to-book ratio (our q ap-
proximation) had the correct sign, were statistically significant, and
were quantitatively important in both 1976 and 1984. The coefficient
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important in both the repurchase and the acquisition probits. This
finding suggests, consistent with Tobin's q theory and Jensen's free
— cashflow hypothesis, that firms that sell at a discount relative to book
ase) valueare more likely to engage in share repurchases or acquisitions,
presumably as an alternative to unprofitable further investments in their
primary activity. The investment ratio was marginally significant and
consistent with the free cash flow theory for repurchases in 1976, but
its coefficient was insignificant in 1984.
Consistently, the variable with the largest t-statistic and the one that
most greatly affected the probability of an action was participation the
preceeding year. Thus, share repurchases and acquisitions appear to
be "habit forming." This trait is consistent with the clientele hypoth-
esis, which asserts that firms specialize in how they transmit cash to
their owners.
The tests for structural change across time failed to reject the hy-
pothesis that the determinants of repurchases and acquisitions are un-
— changedover time. This may be somewhat surprising, given that the
aggregate levels of these activities have increased so dramatically in
recent years. We do demonstrate that the intercept has time depen-
'ith dence. In subsequent research we hope that by addressing other con-
ees siderations, including the existence of a takeover threat and tax
iull information, we can explain the effects now captured by the dummy
ur- variable. Nonetheless, the failure of this study to find structural change
ne- in the determinants of participation does suggest that the theories tested
in here were consistently operative in both years examined.
se In further work we plan to examine how these phenomena are af-
ry fected by provisions in the 1986 Tax Reform Act. This major realign-





We began with 2,399 Industrial, 853 OTC, and 1,289 Research ob-
ry servations. Of these, 29 lacked all information including CUSIP num-
se bers. Thus, we manipulated the data from 4,512 original observations
P- to achieve the resultant 2,366 points for 1976 and 1,820 points for 1984.
Table 7.1! lists the Compustat definitions of our dependent variables.
flt It should be noted that we included both cash and stock-swap acqui-
sitions. Analysis of data in Mergers and Acquisitions indicated the vast210Laurie Simon Bagwell and John B. Shoven 211
Table7.11 Compustal Definitions of the Dependent Variables and
sam
Acquisition: "Thefunds for, or the costs relating to, the acquisition of a company in a
current or prior year as reported on the statement of changes."
Includes:
I. Cost of the net assets of the business acquired
2. Acquisition of additional ownership (a decrease in minority interest) Nc
3.Additional interest in the company (if the company is consolidated)
4. Retail assets in the business acquired
5. Property, plants, and equipment of the acquired company
2
6. Long-term debt assumed in acquisition
thern
Repurchase:"Useof funds which decreases common and/or preferred stock." gain
gain
Includes: Mill
I. Purchase of treasury stock
3
2. Retirement or redemption of preferred stock the'
3. Retirement or redemption of redeemable preferred stock proj
4. Retirement of common stock sub
5. Conversion of preferred stock into common stock
4
6. Conversion of Class A, Class B, special stock, etc., into common stock
5
gail
majorityof 1984 acquisitions were cash deals, suggesting that the in-
clusion of stock-swaps would not strongly affect our analysis for that low
year. 6
The 1984 research file consists of companies deleted from other Corn- act
pustatfiles because of acquisition or merger, bankruptcy, liquidation, hol
delisting,or inconsistent reporting. Thus, many of those companies
may have had observations for 1976 (if they existed before the deli sting)
but not for 1984. This is one explanation of the disparity between the
numberof observations for 1976 and 1984. Ufl
We then created dummy variables for repurchasing and acquisitions,
rel giving missing values a zero. We did this because Compustat counts To
insignificant figures as not available. Thus, as missing data are poten- we
tially in actuality insignificant, we set them equal to zero to maximize an
theinformation obtainable from the dependent variables. (Note, how-
ever, that since a firm often has many, or all, points missing, many of
these firms were subsequently "relost" by missing another variable.) ch
The repurchase dummy variable was assigned a one only if the firm
bought more than one-half of one percent of its outstanding share equity
value. We also created the inventory dummy to beoneif either the
firmchosesolely LIFO, or else LIFO was the primary choice of two R
inventory valuation methods; otherwise it was zero.
TSP probit executes only for complete observations, and we elimi-
nated from the analysis firms missing any of the necessary variables.
We then eliminated any debt-equity ratios that were either negative or
exceeded100, as we found ratios outside these parameters implausible,
L211 ShareRepurchases and Acquisitions
and suggestive of erred data. This procedure therefore resulted in the
— samplesof 2,366 for 1976 and I ,820 for 1984.
Notes
1. See, for example, Auerbach (1983).
2. Gordon and Bradford (1980) argued that the implication of tax rules for
the preference for capital gains is not so unambiguously in favor of capital
gains. The importance of the differentials between ordinary income and capital
gains taxation in dividend policy is still an unsettled issue. See, in addition,
Miller and Scholes (1982).
3. The repurchase is treated as a capital gain if. according to Section 302 of
the U.S. internal Revenue Service code, the redemption is "substantially dis-
proportionate." Vermaelen's (1981) sample had only 3 out of 105 tender offers
subject to ordinary income taxes.
4. This example is found in Shoven (1986).
5. Recent studies have demonstrated how differing basis values given capital
gains taxation result in these choices. The Balcer and Judd (1985) life-cycle
model showed the optimal decision rule to be the selling of those shares with
the highest basis values first. Bagwell (1986) also demonstrated how the het-
1T1 erogeneous basis values of shareholders result in selling by those with the
hat lowest basis last.
6. There is no evidence that the rate of return on the common stock of the
rn- acquiring firm is abnormal, whereas there is an excess return enjoyed by the
)fl holders of the securities of the acquired firm (Dennis and McConnell 1986).
7. See, for example, Black (1976).
ICS 8. At the suggestion of Jerry Green, we examined an alternative measure of
ng) cash flow. It approximated the free cash flow available after replacement in-
the vestment scaled by total assets. In general, the qualitative results were
unchanged.
9. A problem with the one-year lagged participation variables is that some
repurchase and share acquisition programs span more than one calendar year.
fltS To consider whether this overlap biased the lagged participation coefficient,
we ran the probits with a two-year lagged repurchase dummy. Its significance
ize and importance remained.
10. We chose 1976, instead of ten years before 1984, or 1974, because of
Nathan and O'Keefe's (1986) finding of a structural change event in 1974. We
therefore wanted to separate out this finding from other structural changes and
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Comment David F. Bradford
a-
a!
Bagwelland Shoven'spaper investigates a phenomenon that is im-
e. portant in part because of the serious challenge it poses to economic
analysis. The problem is this: In an active market populated by agents
with very sharp pencils, the participants do not appear to optimize..
Year in and year out, which we might interpret as an "equilibrium"
state, firms choose to pay out dividends in spite of the availability of
other modes of distribution that are significantly better for most share-
a! holders and worse for none. The most obvious alternative is repurchase
a! of the firm's own shares in the market. With apparently minor quali-
fications, share repurchases are definitely superior to dividend pay-
Ic ments. Yet dividends continue to be paid.
Bagwell and Shoven start by reminding us of the superiority argu-
ment. They begin with a situation in which the firm has a sum of money
— itwishes to distribute. The state of the firm after the money has left
st its hands would seem to be independent of the route by which the
money departed. All the state variables describing the firm are
David F. Bradford is professor of economics and public affairs at the Woodrow Wilson
School. Princeton University, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Eco-
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independent of the method by which the funds are distributed. Of the mus
two methods, share repurchase generates lower taxes than dividends, not,
This is true in part because of the rate difference between long-term hold
capital gains and dividends and in part because of the deferral of some ther
income in the hands of shareholders, since they can deduct the basis
in shares sold in calculating their income subject to tax. The share I
repurchase method also offers shareholders an opportunity to choose tors
the cash flow they wish to realize from their ownership in the firm. wh
This sums up the case for share repurchase over dividends. Aga
An only slightly more complicated method—using the firm's cash to F
purchase the shares of another firm rather than its own shares—may to c
also be superior to dividend payment as a means of routing cash out
of the firm and into the hands of the public. All that is required to 85 I
accept this is to view the pair of firms involved in a consolidated way.
The authors present a statistical analysis of the characteristics of tha
firms that engaged in (more than a negligible amount of) share repur- oft
chases or acquisitions of other firms (or both) in 1976 and 1984. (It is dlv
not clear from the paper whether the acquisition transactions are for ide
cash from individual shareholders, which they would need to be to sidi
accomplish the equivalent of a share repurchase.) There are essentially
two parts to the puzzle: which firms distribute cash to shareholders; ma
and, among those, how much do they distribute via each of the possible stit
paths—dividends, share repurchase, and acquisition. nei
Although the reasoning behind Bagwell and Shoven's empirical work stil
is based partly on the determinants of cash distributions, rather than dif
on the form those distributions take, the authors are especially inter- fib
estedin the latter. Having noted that dividends are inferior to the other
forms of distribution from the point of view of their after-tax conse- tw
quences for shareholders, but noting also that dividends continue to US
beused, they focus on the factors that make dividends relatively more Pu
or less costly. Let us then briefly review the weak points in the argument
for the superiority of the nondividend forms of transfer. Several might th:
be mentioned. to
First, there is the tiny qualification in the argument given above: that pr
the individual tax rate is constant. Because the tax rate may not be Ifl
constant,the deferral of income associated with share repurchase as ar
a method of distribution may conceivably be disadvantageous; the de- di
ferred income may later be subject to a higher tax rate. But if the to
shareholder anticipates the higher tax rate, the optimal behavior on his
part would be to realize the income now in any case, so that this is a
very minor problem indeed.
Second, to qualify for capital gains rather than dividend treatment,
the net effect of the share repurchase must not look like that of a
dividend. That is, the distribution of ownership among shareholders215 Share Repurchases and Acquisitions
the must be changed by the share repurchase, at least in the short run. If
is. not, the tax authorities have the power to require the selling share-
rm holders to report the proceeds as a dividend for tax purposes. Although
me there is some theoretical reason to expect this sanction, it is in fact
very rare and should be easy to avoid.
ire Third, the share repurchase method may subject the board of direc-
se tors to some risk. If the firm's shares increase in value, a shareholder
rn who earlier tendered may have a basis for suit against the directors.
Again, my impression is that this risk is very small.
to Fourth, for some shareholders dividends may in fact be preferable
ay to capital gains. An important class of shareholders for which this is
ut true is corporations. Until recently, a corporation could deduct up to
to 85percentof any dividend from its corporate tax base. By contrast, a
y. realized capital gain has been taxed at a flat rate, which, though lower
than the tax on ordinary income, is still much higher than 15 percent
ir- of the regular rate. Perhaps because of this tax fact, most intercorporate
is dividends to be found in the statistical series (putting to one side div-
or idends paid to tax-exempt entities) are flows from wholly owned sub-
to sidiaries to parents.
ly Tax-exempt institutions represent another class of shareholders that
's; may prefer dividends to capital gains. One might think that these in-
le stitutions would be indifferent to the two forms of cash flow, since
neither of them has any tax consequences. But for some of these in-
rk stitutions the regulatory restrictions would treat the forms of cash flow
In differently. Universities, for example, may be allowed to spend cash
r- flowing from dividends, but not cash flowing from share repurchases.
A fifth counterargument to Bagwell and Shoven's analysis is that the
e- two forms of distribution convey different signals to the market. The
usual way of putting this is to say that the fact that a firm is able to
put cash dividends in the hands of shareholders must indicate that there
n reallyare some earnings there. Two comments might be made about
it this.First, the ability to distribute cash bears no necessary connection
to current earnings. Second, it would seem a very simple matter to
provide methods for auditing the repurchase of shares by corporations
in such a way as to make it entirely equivalent to a dividend as far as
is any cash distribution can serve as a signal of a firm's underlying con-
ditions. There is no obvious reason one could not make a commitment
to future distributions in much the same way that firms appear to have
commitments to regular dividend distributions. It should, however, be
a conceded that one could imagine problems with the tax authorities if
the policy looked too much like dividends.
A sixth set of arguments is based on transactions costs. I must say,
a I find these arguments the most compelling. One can identify significant
s transactions cost differences at both the firm and the shareholder level.216Laurie Simon Bagwell and John B. Shoven 217
At the firm level it seems very likely that arranging for share repurchase, the in
which I believe is typically by tender offer at a specified price, is more capita
costly than the routine payment of dividends. At the shareholder level woulc
the arguments run in both directions. For the shareholder who wants
the cash flow associated with a dividend, the share repurchase route Th
may be more costly, since it is necessary to go to the expense of selling possil
a portion of the portfolio. Furthermore, for small shareholders it will show
often be impossible to match exactly the tax flow associated with the firms
dividend. (b) sI
In a world of no transactions costs, the dividend route might be affec
presumed to generate no incentives to change portfolios. The day be- ment
fore the distribution, the shareholder owns a claim to the package of Bagw
assets represented by the firm, including the firm's bank balance. The foun
day after the distribution, the firm's bank balance is down, but the doinl
shareholder's bank balance is up by the same amount. And the share- to. I
holder's portfolio is the same in real terms. With transactions costs, take
however, all bets are off. Shareholders are always in the position of
wishing they had different portfolios, but not wishing it enough to incur
R the cost of rebalancing. A nondividend distribution by the firm, with
e &
no offsetting portfolio adjustment, might leave any given shareholder Gon
better off or worse off. It is not at all clear that one method of distri-
bution is superior to the other in this respect, that is, in terms either 36
of the shareholder's transactions costs of rebalancing or of his loss of
utility resulting from the deviation that might prevail from the portfolio
he would have chosen in the absence of transactions costs.
The Bagwell and Shoven discussion of the choice among distribution Co
modesas an element of an anti-takeover strategy depends on this sort
of transactions-cost effect. The argument, as I understand it, is that The
shareholders who would tender their shares in a repurchase transaction the
are the ones closest to overcoming the transactions-cost impediment
to rebalancing their portfolios. By picking those shareholders off, in- reti
cumbent management can impose higher transactions costs as the price the
to a would-be takeover bidder, of
A final counterargument in favor of dividends is that shareholders the
are essentially irrational on the subject. That is, they care about the
form of the cash flow as well as its substance. They simply like divi- the
dends. I regret to say, I'm afraid this explanation may be the leading res
candidate. bet
There is a scrap of evidence relating to the nature of this possible
irrationality, contained in a paper I wrote with Roger Gordon (1980). ma
The question is whether it is the managers of firms or the shareholders an(
whose behavior is inconsistent with the relevant maximization, which
here is presumably maximization of shareholders' after-tax returns.
The econometric results in our paper can be interpreted as saying that Res
L-1
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Se, the market places equal value on returns in the form of dividends and
ore capital gains (appropriately adjusting for risk). If this is true, there
vel would be no reason to fault managers for their choice of policies.
nts Instead, the puzzle is in the behavior of the shareholders.
The problem confronting Bagwell and Shoven is that none of these
possible counterweights, except the last, suggests differences that should
jill show up in a cross-section of firms. For the last one implies (a) that
he firmscan do whatever theyhabitually do and perhapsthat
(b) shareholders may slowly learn what they are spending on their
be affection for dividends and gradually come to demand that manage-
ments use the more favorable forms of distribution. My reading of the
of Bagwell and Shoven evidence is that this is the main thing they have
he found: When firms have a lot of cash, they tend to distribute it. In
he doing so, they use the mode of distribution they have grown accustomed
to. There is some tendency, however, for the nondividend forms to




er Gordon,Roger H.,andDavid F.Bradford.1980. Taxation and the stock market
•I- valuation of capital gains and dividends. Journalof Public Economics 14:109—
er 36.
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Comment Jerry R. Green
rt
The theory of finance has supplied us with no determinate model of
the optimal capital structure of the firm. Equally lacking has been a
it theory of optimal cash flow management. Despite this lack of a theo-
retical underpinning, Bagwell and Shoven attempt to use evidence on
e the merger and share repurchase behavior of firms to provide a measure
of firms' attempts to adjust toward financial targets and to minimize
their owners' tax liabilities. In this respect their paper is openly and
e unashamedly empirical. By developing data and exploring these issues,
the authors have done a great service to future work on this topic. The
g results of their study, however, with a few exceptions that I will mention
below, cannot be regarded as a definitive test of economic hypotheses.
Any model of adjustment toward an optimally determined economic
magnitude has two ingredients: a theory of where the target should be;
and a theory of the costs of adjustment toward the target level, using
JerryR. Green is professor of economics and chairman of the Department of Econom-
ics, Harvard University, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic
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one or more instruments. Economic theory is much better at supplying /
the former ingredient than the latter. Adjustment costs are hard to
theorize about—they are just measured. lea
Their measurement requires knowing where the desired level is. ser
Based on this knowledge one can estimate the speed of adjustment
toward it. If we assume the marginal cost being "out of equilibrium," ser
away from the target, increases with the distance from the target, the
speed of adjustment is a proper measure of these unknown costs, per
In the present context the desired level is itself unknown. It is not sig
something that is parameterized within the model, and the evidence in tru
this paper does not bear upon it. The intensity with which firms use of
share repurchases and mergers to make financial adjustments cannot ing
be used to identify simultaneously the costs of being away from the the
target, the costs of adjusting toward the target, and the location of the Pu
target itself. is
This paper does not claim to be an adjustment cost explanation of sio
firms' financial behavior, although the authors do seem to want to ca
proceed along these lines in their future work. What they do accomplish
is twofold. They give a very interesting exploratory data analysis of fin
the incidence of share repurchasing and merger behavior, and they fro
amply document the fact that this behavior, however generated, has oti
not remained the same over the past decade. ml
As one of the authors has shown in other work, the idea of share or
repurchases, though not a new one, is being seriously rethought by
firms' financial managers. Bagwell and Shoven demonstrate that the re
two time periods studied are very different indeed. Hence, researchers ot
must be very cautious about pooling time-series evidence on the rate ar
of share repurchases.
Not too many years ago we thought that share repurchases were as
quasi-legal, or at least somewhat tainted. Up to now, however, we have av
not become aware of the substantial legal or tax problems that have fe
arisen for firms that have engaged in this activity. Does that mean that of
the corporate sector is on a learning curve, finding out how much
dividend tax avoidance via share repurchases will be tolerated? If it th
does, the analysis of this paper, though qualitatively interesting, cannot W
quantifythe issue of adjustment costs. How are we to know whether Si
we are just on the beginning of a learning curve, and soon to see share ki
repurchasessupplant dividends entirely, or whether the two time pe- in
nods investigated in the paper represent the beginning and the end of fi
a learning process? One would need more than two points to identify in
the parameters of any learning curve. One suggestion I have, therefore, th
is to redo this analysis for other years so that the true rate of accel-
eration of this behavior can be estimated. ai219 Share Repurchases and Acquisitions
g Although the theory of finance has not given us a fully consistent plc-
ture of capital structure, it has provided many partial models that would
lead us to believe the primary determinants of capital structure are unob-
servable. Not only are these variables hard to measure, and surely not
t available in the Compustat data base, but they are fundamentally unob-
servable. Indeed, the message of these theories of finance is that the very
financial practices under investigation in the Bagwell and Shoven pa-
per—dividends, mergers and cash management practices—are used to
t signal the true unobservables to the financial and product markets. The
true determinants of the optimal capital structure may include the costs
of bonding between management and shareholders, the ease of monitor-
t ing manager's actions, and other informational data. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the authors find no evidence at all that the use of share re-
purchases and mergers is an attempt to alter the capital structure. There
is probably just too much heterogeneity in these unobservable dimen-
sions across firms for the few observables to be accurate predictors of
cash flow management practices.
Share repurchases are often generated as part and parcel of other
financial or other real activities of the firm. In some cases they arise
from the sale of a division or a significant contraction in scale. But in
other cases they arise in combination with a refinancing unrelated to
immediate real operations. They may accompany the issuance of debt
or preferred shares.
Bagwell and Shoven look at the cash management side of share
repurchases in isolation. It would be interesting to tie the issuance of
other securities to the share repurchase question, and the data on this
are available in the same sources as those the authors use. One hy-
pothesis that could be tested in this way concerns whether firms are
ascertaining the legality of their share repurchases as a dividend tax
avoidance action. It seems more likely that share repurchases are de-
fensible when a serious contraction is taking place, rather than as part
of a refinancing of a firm operating at constant scale.
This paper also looks at certain aspects of clientele effects: Are firms
that repurchase their shares more apt to be held by individuals for
whom the tax advantage of such an action is relatively more important?
Such a question embodies two hypotheses. First is that the firm, with
knowledge of who its owners are, chooses a course of action in their
interest. But the second, equally plausible in my opinion, is that the
firm chooses what it believes to be a preferable financial strategy, hop-
ing to attract ownership by taxable investors who may benefit from
this strategy. I doubt that these two hypotheses can be disentangled
by using only data on firms' behavior. Nonetheless, the paper offers
an interesting first step in this direction.
/4220Laurie Simon Bagwell and John B. Shoven
Finally, Bagwell and Shoven offer a very interesting discussion of
the use of share repurchases as a takeover defense. The evidence
accumulated in this paper should be combined with the growing data
bases on mergers and takeovers and on the attempt to execute such
transactions by tender offers. I have no doubt that the approach taken
in this paper will be very useful in such future research efforts.
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